Introduction
A large body of empirical work suggests that greater competition enhances productivity.
For example, Nickel (1996) …nds that U.K. manufacturing …rms facing a larger number of competitors experienced higher productivity growth, and Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002) show that increased competitive pressure in the iron ore industry during the 1980s can explain productivity increases of up to 100 percent in some countries. 1 Often, greater competition and higher productivity are linked to market size. For example, Syverson (2004) documents in a study of the U.S. cement industry that …rms in larger cities are more productive, and Luzio and Greenstein (1995) and Lewis (2004) document substantial increases in productivity following a reduction in trade barriers in the Brazilian computer and automobile industries. 2 Despite this empirical support, the question of how larger markets and greater competition facilitate innovation is very much an open one. This paper proposes a novel mechanism whereby larger markets lead to more competition and facilitate the adoption of more advanced technologies. The mechanism works by changing the price elasticity of demand. Larger populations or greater openness allow for more substitution between goods, thereby raising the price elasticity of demand.
As a result, mark-ups fall and competition toughens. With lower mark-ups …rms must sell more goods to break even. This increase in …rm size is essential for innovation. As larger …rms are able to amortize the …xed costs of R&D over a greater number of goods, they …nd it more pro…table to adopt more advanced technologies.
The idea that …rm size facilitates process innovation has a long history in economics, going back as far as Schumpeter (1942) . There is much empirical evidence supporting this view. For example, Atack et al. (2008) …nd that larger …rms were more likely to use steam power in the 19th century. Hannan and McDowell (1984) reach a similar conclusion when analyzing the relationship between the size of banks and the 1 See Blundell et al. (1999) and Zitzewitz (2003) for further evidence on the positive relation between competition and innovation. For quantitative evidence on the negative e¤ects of monopoly and entry barriers on TFP, see Herrendorf and Teixeira (2007) . 2 For a survey of the empirical evidence on the relation between trade liberalization and productivity, see Tybout (2003 Cohen and Klepper (1996) …nd that they rise with …rm size, with a greater share being allocated to process innovation. The novelty of our paper, therefore, is not its emphasis on the importance of …rm size for innovation, but rather the establishment of a general equilibrium link between market size, …rm size and innovation through the price elasticity of demand.
We make price elasticity dependent on market size by embedding Lancaster (1979) preferences into an otherwise standard model of product and process innovation. The Lancaster construct, which is based on Hotelling's (1929) spatial model of horizontal di¤erentiation, assumes that each consumer has an 'ideal variety', identi…ed by his location on the unit circle. By having all varieties located on the unit circle, the product space is bounded. 3 This boundedness of the product space underlies the positive relationship between market size and the price elasticity of demand. A larger market, in the sense of a larger population, leads to more varieties being produced, implying a more crowded product space, and more substitution between goods. A larger market, in the sense of lower trade costs, does not increase the number of varieties being produced, but does make goods more substitutable as foreign produced varieties become more a¤ordable for home consumers.
Allowing the elasticity to depend on the market size, as we do here, implies a positive scale e¤ect on process innovation, thus overturning the conventional wisdom in the trade and growth literatures. The standard view in these literatures is that once one endogenizes the number of varieties, there is no longer a positive e¤ect of population or trade liberalization on process innovation. The absence of such a positive scale e¤ect re ‡ects the dominance of the Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preference construct. With Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz there is no elasticity e¤ect because the product space is unbounded. Hence, as the market expands, there is no change in elasticity, mark-ups and …rm size. As a result, larger markets do not make it easier to bear the …xed costs of innovation. In e¤ect, with Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the additional rents associated with an increase in market size are completely dissipated by a proportional increase in the number of varieties, leaving no room for process innovation. This point was made by Grossman and Helpman (1991a, chapter 9) in the context of trade liberalization and by Young (1998) in the context of eliminating the growth rate scale e¤ect present in the …rst generation endogenous growth models which did not allow for product innovation. 4 As we show here, making the elasticity depend on the market size causes this positive scale e¤ect to re-emerge. 5 The empirical evidence is far more supportive of Hotelling-Lancaster than of Lancaster construct is more consistent with certain empirical regularities, we are the …rst to consider its relevance for technological innovation. In doing so, we show that the di¤erence between Hotelling-Lancaster and Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz is not only empirically relevant, it is also theoretically important.
Indeed, one key theoretical implication of our model is that the productivity gains associated with larger markets are the result of innovations by established …rms. While there is ample evidence that established …rms innovate more when trade is liberalized, 4 See Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . 5 One notable exception of a model that generates an elasticity e¤ect using the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz is Holmes and Schmitz (2001) . However, they accomplish this in an arti…cial manner. In particular, they assume that domestic …rms can a¤ect the manufacturing price index but foreign …rms cannot. This leads to the odd results that the e¤ect of taking two equally sized countries in autarky and going to free trade is di¤erent from the e¤ect of doubling the population of a given country. this result is not easily obtained in general equilibrium models. 7 With the exception of Atkeson and Burstein (2007) , the literature on trade and productivity does not consider process innovation by existing …rms, but instead emphasizes …rm selection that favors the 'survival of the …ttest'. 8 model. In contrast, we …nd positive e¤ects on process innovation, both when there is a marginal decrease in trade costs and when we compare autarky to free trade. 9 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a one-period, two-country model. Section 3 de…nes the equilibrium for this open economy and characterizes it along several dimensions. Section 4 examines the equilibrium properties of the model, in particular, how process innovation depends on the size of the market. Section 5 concludes.
The Model Economy
The model consists of two identical countries, referred to as Home and Foreign, and indexed by i = H; F . Each country contains a business sector and a household sector.
The business sector is monopolistically competitive and produces a set of di¤erentiated goods. Each di¤erentiated good producer acts as a monopolist and chooses its price, quantity and production process. The sole input in each production process, or technology, is labor. Individual technologies di¤er in the marginal product of labor and the …xed operating cost. The household sector supplies labor to the business sector and uses its income to buy the di¤erentiated goods. Households are heterogeneous in that each has a di¤erent variety of the good it prefers above all others. In contrast to households, goods can be moved across countries, although at some cost. We study a one-period world since the e¤ect of larger markets on innovation can be shown without introducing dynamics. The sectors are described in detail in what follows.
Household Sector
Endowments and Preferences. In each country there is a continuum of measure L of households uniformly distributed around the unit circle. Each household is endowed with one unit of time that it supplies inelastically to the business sector. Household preferences are of the Hotelling-Lancaster type so that each household has one variety identi…ed by its location on the unit circle that it prefers above all others. The farther away a particular variety, v, lies from a household's ideal variety,ṽ, the lower the utility 
Let w i denote the wage earnings of a household residing in country i = H; F . As we subsequently explain, this is the only source of household income in the economy.
It follows from the household's budget constraint that a household in i = H; F that consumes variety v 0 does so in a quantity given by
This is the demand for variety v 0 by an individual household with ideal varietyṽ. Its demand for all other varieties v 2 V is zero.
Business Sector
Technology. The business sector in each country is monopolistically competitive, and produces a set of di¤erentiated goods. These goods can be traded internationally, but at a cost. Trade costs are of the iceberg type; to deliver one unit of a given variety overseas requires a shipment of 1 units. There is free entry and exit of …rms. Each …rm is located at a speci…c point on the unit circle, corresponding to the variety it produces.
As in Lancaster (1979) , …rms can costlessly relocate on the circle.
A …rm can choose between a continuum of increasing returns to scale technologies indexed by the letter 0 to produce its di¤erentiated good. Labor is the sole input to each technology. The technologies di¤er in the marginal product of labor and the …xed cost to using the technology. More speci…cally, the marginal product of labor associated with technology is A(1 + ) and the …xed labor cost of operating technology is e .
Let Q i v be the quantity of variety v produced by a …rm using technology in country i = H; F and let L i v denote the units of labor it employs. Then,
We assume that > 0 and > 0 so that the …xed cost is an increasing, convex function of the technology. 10 Subsequently, we refer to = 0 as the 'benchmark'technology.
1 0 We assume a …xed cost, rather than a sunk cost, because it ensures zero pro…ts in equilibrium. The 6 working papers series
Pro…t Maximization. The …xed labor cost implies that each variety, regardless of the technology used, will be produced by a single …rm. In maximizing their pro…ts, …rms behave non-cooperatively, taking the choices of other …rms in both countries as given. They also take all aggregate variables as given. 11 Each …rm chooses the price and quantity of its good to be sold in the Home country, the price and quantity of its good to be sold in the Foreign country, the number of workers to hire, and the technology to be operated.
For reasons of space, we only present the pro…t maximization problem facing Home …rms. (Expressions for Foreign …rms can be derived by analogy.) Before writing the expression for a …rm's pro…t, we introduce some additional notation. In particular,
we use a double superscript so as to distinguish between the production location and the consumption location of a given variety, where the …rst superscript refers to the production location and the second refers to the consumption location. For example, C HF denotes the Foreign consumption of a Home-produced variety, and C HH denotes the Home consumption of a Home-produced variety. In light of this additional notation, we suppress the subscript, v, in the analysis that follows.
Using the production function (3) together with the fact that the …rm's total output meets the demand of Home and Foreign consumers, namely,
distinction is not critical for the results we wish to establish, however. We think of the higher …xed cost as being associated not only with operating the technology but also with developing it.
1 1 This is the standard assumption in models of monopolistic competition, and in principle it requires …rms to be of measure zero. Since in our model only a …nite number of varieties will be produced in equilibrium, this condition is certainly not satis…ed. However, it is easy to see how we could make …rms to be of measure zero, without changing any of our results. Instead of having one business sector with a …nite number of …rms located around the unit circle, assume there is a continuum of business sectors on the interval [0,1]. Each business sector, indexed by s, has a …nite number of …rms located around a unit circle, also indexed by s. In that case, each producer becomes in…nitesimally small relative to the overall market, and thus takes all aggregate variables as given. To model this, the only di¤erence we would need to introduce is in the preference expression (1). Instead of choosing the variety v that maximizes (1), a household in country i located at pointṽ s on unit circle s now chooses in each sector s the variety v s that maximizes
The rest of the model would be exactly the same. Because of the already cumbersome notation of the open economy, we do not introduce this further complication in the main model.
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where p HH and p HF are the prices of a Home-produced variety in the Home and the Foreign markets. A Home …rm chooses (p HH , p HF , ) to maximize the above equation, subject to demand in the Home market and demand in the Foreign market, taking the wage, w H , as given. As in the standard monopoly problem, the pro…t maximizing price in each market is a markup over the marginal unit cost w H =(A(1 + )), so that
where " HH and " HF are the price elasticities of demand for variety v in the Home country and in the Foreign country. Namely,
The …rst order necessary condition associated with the choice of technology, , is
where the inequality in the above expression corresponds to a corner solution, i.e., = 0.
Equilibrium
As is standard in this literature, we only focus on symmetric Nash equilibria. In such an equilibrium, all …rms use the same technology, and all goods are equally spaced along the unit circle. Moreover, each Home produced variety is surrounded by two and v F is the one located at distance d HH from v H shown in Figure 1 , where
Given this indi¤erence condition applies to households both to the right and to the left 
Again, since this indi¤erence condition applies to households both to the right and to the left of v H , a share 2d HF of Foreign households consumes variety v H . The total amount of variety v H consumed in the Foreign market is thus
This is the Foreign demand for v H .
With these demands in hand, we can solve for the price elasticities in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. This can be done in in two steps. Recall that d HH is the shortest arc distance between the …rm and the indi¤erent Home customer, and d is the shortest arc distance between the …rm and its nearest competitor. First, it is easy to derive from Home demand (10) and (4) that
Next, we solve for the partial derivative @d HH =@p HH by taking the total derivative of the indi¤erence equation (9) with respect to p HH . This yields
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By analogy, the elasticity faced by a Home …rm in the Foreign market is
The equations that characterize a Home …rm's pro…t maximizing decisions are (6), (7), (8), (14), and (15), and the equations that characterize utility maximization associated with a Home variety are (9), (10), (11) and (12) . In addition to utility maximization and pro…t maximization, the market for each variety clears in equilibrium, as expressed in (4).
The labor market must also clear in each country. As d is the shortest-arc distance between any two varieties on the unit circle, it follows that the number of varieties produced in the world is 1=d. Thus, each country produces 1=(2d) varieties. Given the production function (3), each Home …rm employs e + (C HH + C HF )=(A(1 + )) units of labor, so that labor market clearing in the Home country requires
There is a …nal equilibrium condition that must be satis…ed in each country:
the zero pro…t condition. This is a consequence of free entry and exit. The zero pro…t condition of a …rm located in the Home country is
The zero pro…t condition determines the number of varieties produced in the Home country. Analogous expressions for (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16) and (17) exist for the Foreign country.
We are now ready to de…ne a symmetric equilibrium.
De…nition of Symmetric Equilibrium. A Symmetric Equilibrium is a vector of ele-
, where i; j 2 fH; F g, i 6 = j, and x ii = x jj , x ij = x ji and x i = x j for any variable x , that satis…es conditions (4), (6) , (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16) and (17).
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Equilibrium Properties
The purpose of this section is to examine how the choice of technology depends on the size of the market. We do this in two ways. First, we study the e¤ect of an increase in population size. Next, we study the e¤ect of a decrease in trade costs.
Population Size and Technology Choice
In this subsection we analyze how technology adoption depends on population size. For this purpose, it would be intuitive to focus on a closed economy model. However, having We start by proving that for any population size there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. This is followed by a proof that shows that the equilibrium value of is increasing in the size of the population.
Proposition 1.
For each population size there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. With the exception of the technology choice, our model is identical to the one studied in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2008) . They show that for a given technology and population size, the symmetric equilibrium is uniquely determined by equations (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16) and (17), that is, by all but condition (8) in the de…nition of a Symmetric Equilibrium. Thus, once we endogenize the technology process, we only need to show that there is a unique that satis…es the …rst order condition with respect to technology choice (8) . To do this we simplify (8) . Note that with zero iceberg costs, C ii = C ij = C. The …rst step in this simpli…cation is to insert the price expressions (6) and (7) into the zero pro…t condition (17) . This yields 2C = A(1+ )(" 1) e . The next step is to insert this expression into equation (8), so that the …rst order necessary condition with respect to becomes
12 working papers series Condition (18) can be further simpli…ed to
Proving that there is a unique equilibrium amounts to showing that there is a unique that satis…es (19) . We denote this by . To demonstrate this, it su¢ ces to show that " is a strictly decreasing function of and that 1 + (1 + ) is a strictly increasing function of . These two relations are represented in Figure 2 . 13 The fact that 1 + (1 + ) is increasing in is immediate. Regarding ", under symmetry and zero iceberg costs the elasticity expressions (14) and (15) both simplify to
Since the total production of a …rm is e A(1+ )(" 1), and the total population is 2L, the total number of …rms in the world is n = 2L=( e "), where n = 1=d. Substituting into (20) gives
Now re-write (21) as 2 " +1 (2 + 1)" (4L= e ) = 0 and take the total derivative of this expression with respect to . This yields
From (14) and (15) we know that " > 1, so that this derivative (22) is strictly negative.
The fact that " is decreasing in , and the fact that 1+(1+ ) is increasing in , implies that there is exactly one value of that satis…es " = 1 + (1 + ) . Denote this value of by 0 . If 0 > 0, then the equilibrium in (19) is equal to 0 . If 0 0, then in (19) is zero. There is thus a unique satisfying the …rst order condition (19) . This, together with the result of Hummels and Lugovskyy (2008), proves there is a unique symmetric equilibrium for each population size.
Having shown that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, we now turn to the issue of how the equilibrium value of depends on the size of the population. We Figure 2 : Equilibrium Technology …rst demonstrate that the price elasticity of demand, ", is an increasing function of the population. 14 This implies that the downward sloping schedule in Figure 2 shifts up when the population increases. Since the upward sloping schedule in Figure 2 is independent of the population, this allows us to conclude that the equilibrium technology choice and the equilibrium elasticity " both increase with the size of the population. In what follows we prove this.
Proposition 2. In a symmetric equilibrium with zero iceberg costs, is increasing in the size of the population.
Proof. The proof amounts to showing that the downward sloping graph in Figure 2 shifts out in response to an increase in population. This is equivalent to showing that that the derivative of the elasticity expression (21) with respect to L is positive. For this purpose, we again rewrite (21) as 2 " +1 (2 + 1)" (4L= e ) = 0 and totally di¤erentiate with respect to L while holding the value of …xed. This gives 14 working papers series
Since " > 1, the above partial derivative is strictly positive, so that an increase in L leads to a greater elasticity of demand for any given . We are now ready to complete the proof. From Proposition 1 we know that for each population size there is a unique that is the solution to (19) . We have shown in the …rst part of the proof that " is increasing in L. Thus, the left hand side (19) is increasing in L, whereas the right hand side does not depend on L. Since the left hand side is decreasing in , and the right hand side is increasing in , this implies that is increasing in L.
As the intersection of the two schedules in Figure 2 also gives the equilibrium value of ", it is obvious that it, too, is increasing in the size of the population. In contrast to (23) , this takes into account that is endogenous. This result is stated in the following Corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary. In a symmetric equilibrium with zero iceberg costs, " is increasing in the size of the population.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. For the moment, ignore the technology choice of …rms. As the population increases, more …rms enter the variety space. As a result, the price elasticity of demand increases and markups fall. Thus, to break even, …rms must sell more goods. Indeed, since the equilibrium number of workers per …rm is e ", and " and is an increasing function of L, greater population size leads to larger …rms both in terms of goods produced and employment. This implies that the number of …rms increases less-than-proportionally with population size. Indeed,
where, as shown in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2008),
Since this expression is less than one, the percentage change in the number of …rms resulting from a one percentage change in the population is less than one as well.
The resulting larger …rms endogenously choose higher values of . To see this, note that the …rst order condition (8) with respect to has two e¤ects: an increase in 15 working papers series raises a …rm's …xed cost and it lowers its marginal cost. The former (negative) e¤ect is independent of …rm size, whereas the latter (positive) e¤ect is increasing in …rm size.
This explains why larger …rms choose higher values of , giving rise to a positive relation between population size and technological progress.
The elasticity channel is critical for these results. This is apparent from (19) , which is the …rst order condition for a …rm's technology choice. Because the price elasticity schedule shifts up in response to a higher population, the equilibrium value of consistent with (19) is an increasing function of population. If, instead, the elasticity channel were to be shut o¤ somehow, and " were thus to be independent of L, then the value of consistent with (19) would no longer depend on L. In that case, an increase in market size would have no e¤ect on innovation. This is the result obtained by Young (1998) when using Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.
Of course, the price elasticity of demand is a market concept, so it should be possible to understand our results at the more basic level of preferences and technology.
Towards this goal, consider how a social planner would run the economy. Because of household heterogeneity, there is the issue of what is a reasonable objective function for the planner. Given that the equilibrium for the decentralized economy is characterized by equal consumption, assume the planner maximizes the average utility of households subject to the constraint that every household consumes the same quantity. 15 For increases, but also to increase …rm size, as larger …rms result in greater consumption per household on account of the …xed operating cost. As a result, for a given technology, the planner of a more highly populated economy would create not only more …rms, but also larger …rms. 16 It is then a short step to understand why the planner would prefer more productive technologies in bigger markets. With larger …rms, the share of labor used to cover the …xed cost associated with a given technological upgrade is lower. Thus, the planner would choose more innovation.
Trade Liberalization and Technology Choice
In this subsection we interpret market size as trade liberalization, and explore how lower trade costs a¤ect technology adoption. We note that if trade liberalization is interpreted as going from autarky to free trade, then this is equivalent to an increase in the size of the population, analyzed in the previous subsection. We therefore interpret trade liberalization as a decrease in positive, but nonprohibitive, iceberg costs. When doing so, the analytical expressions no longer simplify. For this reason we explore the importance of trade liberalization on innovation numerically. For the numerical analysis we use the parameter values listed in Table 1 . The preference parameter, , associated with Lancaster's compensation function, has been assigned a value consistent with the empirical regularity of a positive relation between trade liberalization and mark-ups (Tybout, 2003) . 17 The exact values of the technology 1 6 With Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences this is not the case: the positive utility e¤ect of increasing the number of varieties in proportion to the population is constant, instead of decreasing. The optimal …rm size in the planner's solution is thus be independent of the size of the population. Although the elasticity channel is once again at work, its origin is di¤erent from the case of an increase in the population. In the case of an increase in the population, the variety space becomes more crowded. This is not true in the case of trade liberalization.
Here, a decrease in trade costs intensi…es the competition between neighboring Home and Foreign varieties. The e¤ect of this stronger competition is to eliminate some varieties.
Foreign market are di¤erent. To guarantee that a drop in trade costs leads to an increase in the weighted average of the elasticities, a value of less than 1 is needed.
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To see this, Table 2 reports the number of …rms and the price elasticity of demand that would exist in an equilibrium without technology choice. 18 In other words, it reports the elasticity and the number of …rms that satisfy all but equation (8) in the de…nition of the symmetric equilibrium for = 0. As can be seen, lower trade costs are associated with greater elasticity and fewer …rms. Therefore, while population growth leads to more varieties, trade liberalization leads to less varieties. Nevertheless, in both cases the underlying reason for the positive relation between market size and innovation are the same: the greater elasticity makes …rms larger and leads to a bigger e¤ect on pro…ts when the marginal cost drops. This makes innovation more attractive. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a novel mechanism whereby larger markets lead to the adoption of more advanced technologies. By increasing the number of varieties, larger markets allow for more substitution between varieties, thus raising the price elasticity of demand. 1 8 Since the elasticities faced by a …rm di¤er across markets, the elasticity reported in Table 3 is the weighted average, i.e., "
ii Cii=(Cii + Cij) + " ij Cij=(Cii + Cij).
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As a result, mark-ups fall, and …rms become larger to break even. Larger …rms imply more innovation, as they can spread the …xed costs of R&D over more units. The idea that …rm size is important for innovation is not new. What is clearly new, however, is that we make …rm size dependent on market size through the price elasticity of demand, and that we do so in a tractable general equilibrium model.
We generate the elasticity e¤ect by embedding Hotelling-Lancaster preferences
into an otherwise standard model of product and process innovation. also arises in oligopoly models, such as the one studied by Galí and Zilibotti (1999) .
We conjecture that the prediction that larger markets imply more innovation would be preserved using any of these alternative constructs. 19 There are a number of virtues associated with our approach. First, the mechanism we put forth is supported by a large body of empirical work that relates market size to mark-ups, elasticity and …rm size. Second, our model generates the result that 
Stiglitz did not predict a positive relationship between market size and the balanced path growth rate when both process and product innovation were endogenous. They argued that endogenizing both types of innovation is plausible way to reconcile endogenous growth theory with Jones's (1995) …nding that there was no acceleration in the U.S. growth rate despite a large increase in the number of researchers.
Although making our model dynamic goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that, if we were to use the dynamic framework of Young (1998), we would obtain a positive e¤ect of market size on the balanced path growth rate. To see this, recall that Young (1998) assumes complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers. That is, the …xed cost required to improve the technology by a certain proportion is the same in each period, independently of the initial level of the technology. If, as we have shown, a larger market leads to more process innovation in a one-period static model, complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers imply that in a dynamic model it would lead to more process innovation every period.
To the extent that the existence of such a growth scale e¤ect is viewed as an undesirable property of a model, our paper suggests that it takes more than adding product innovation to process innovation to eliminate the e¤ect. Instead, our paper suggests the alternative approach of assuming incomplete spillovers proposed by Jones (1995), Kortum (1997) , and Segerstrom (1998), known as semi-endogenous growth, is more plausible. Studying the balanced growth path properties of a dynamic model with Hotelling-Lancaster preferences, process and product innovation, and incomplete knowledge spillovers is clearly an issue for future research.
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